The legal framework should also provide for the guarantee of the right of such organizations to establish, participate and participate in the political process on the basis of fair treatment before the law. [i] The CENI conducts publicity activities to publicize the content of its reform proposals. In the absence of a formal mandate for legal reform, CENI participates in the process with other electoral actors. Their main approach over the years has been to present their reform proposals at public hearings organised by parliamentary electoral commissions. These presentations provide the public with a better understanding of the rationale for the proposed amendments to the Elections Act. For example, in the context of the 2005 Electoral Reform Act, the Commission took steps to publicize the content of the bill through presentations at public hearings and partnerships with civil society groups. Electoral laws establish different systems for resolving electoral disputes. This is to be expected, because for other aspects of the electoral process, “electoral frameworks and administrative practices for adjudicating electoral complaints must be based on each country`s unique cultural, political and legal traditions. No single approach or model works everywhere. [iii] The main obstacles affecting the role of the ECA in legal and electoral reform processes in Zambia relate to its mandate, administration and financial capacity. First, it has neither a legal mandate to initiate such reforms nor the power to draft laws.
In its history, the Commission has never been mandated to lead a reform process. Its role is limited to the political input required by electoral reform committees. Therefore, it cannot initiate the process without government authorization. The Commission is essentially part of the Government and cannot be considered to be taking action against it. [17] As the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) concludes: “The legal framework should be structured to be clear, understandable and transparent, and it should take into account all the components of an electoral system necessary to ensure democratic elections.” [xvi] The accessibility requirement of the regulatory framework should also take into account the multiple language requirements that may exist in a given country. Legal frameworks must organize how constituencies are defined and defined. Constituencies must be seen as a favourable political representation and constantly modified to reflect political and social realities. Legal frameworks need to answer some important questions, which can be posed as follows: how often and under what circumstances electoral boundaries should be redrawn; These will include both traditional branches of government and autonomous institutions; Who will have the final say on this? Although gender equality in electoral reforms is a sensitive issue and often faces resistance from various stakeholders, the ECN approach has been an important first step towards institutionalizing the gender perspective in electoral reform processes. The fact that gender has been specified in the content of the reforms proposed by the ECN and endorsed by stakeholders is a positive outcome. In general, the purpose of public funds is both to strengthen the positive role of political parties and to help curb some of the excess money in politics. [xxvii] It is therefore acceptable for a legal framework to provide for the financing of party and candidate campaigns.
Although the European Commission does not have an explicit mandate for draft laws, a proposed legal instrument has been added to the final recommendations on the Public Order Act. However, recommendations to amend the Elections Act and the Political Parties Registration Act, as well as the Campaign Finance Bill, did not take into account the legislative proposals. This case study examines the interface between electoral law, including the right to count that vote, ensuring the integrity of the electoral process, judicial interpretation of the electoral legal framework, and electoral administration in the context of a consolidated democracy. Disclosure reports should be submitted to the Political Finance Regulatory Authority established under the legal framework for these matters and, once submitted, every effort should be made to ensure that the information is made available to the public in a meaningful way. However, more than 25 per cent of countries that require some form of declaration from political parties or candidates do not require such information to be published. [xlvi] Another aspect related to spending restrictions is the issue of so-called “third-party spending” by individuals or groups who are not part of a political campaign, but who may spend money to promote or oppose a particular candidate or political party. When introducing spending limits, the legal framework should take into account whether “third parties” should also be subject to spending restrictions in order to avoid an unbalanced situation in which the spending of political entities is limited, but the spending of “third parties” to defeat or elect candidates and political parties is unlimited. This is not necessarily easy to achieve, for example in the United States, Citizens United v Federal Election Commission (2010), the Supreme Court ruled that constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression prohibit the government from restricting political spending independent of corporations and unions. Overall, election triggers can be divided into two different classes; Administrative complaints and judicial remedies.