According to the doctrine of stare decisis, statements constituting obiter dicta are not binding, although they can be very convincing in some jurisdictions such as England and Wales. For example, in High Trees [5], Justice Denning not only granted the landlord`s application, but added that if the landlord had tried to recover the retroactive rent from the war years, the courts would have prevented him from doing so. Since the landlord did not want to recover the subsequent rent, Denning`s addition was clearly incidental, but this statement became the basis for the modern revival of the forfeiture of promissory notes. Similarly, in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd,[6] the House of Lords held that negligent misrepresentation could give rise to a claim for purely economic loss, even if an exclusion of liability on the basis of the facts was effective in dismissing any claim. Similarly, in Scruttons Ltd v. Midland Silicones Ltd,[7] Lord Reid suggested that, although the doctrine of contract secrecy in this case prevented longshoremen from benefiting from the protection of an opt-out clause, such protection could be effective in the future if four directives (which he listed below) were all complied with. In Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Company[8][9] (a case where a woman who had used a smoked ball as prescribed could claim the advertised reward after a flu), Bowen told LJ: Although useless, dicta are still studied and valued for their potential utility.
Dicta are often included in subsequent opinions and sometimes even serve as the basis for these opinions. The United States v. Carolene Products case is an example, in which Justice Harlan F. Stone suggested in the now famous footnote 4 that a rule of law stricter than the rational basic test should be applied in hypothetical future situations. Finally, the wording of footnote 4 has served as the basis for the doctrine of rigorous examination. In this case, it is a defective device and its warranty, not a dog. The court`s analogy is obiter dicta, because it is not decisive for the court`s decision, but is given only as an explanation. If the dog analogy had been omitted, the court`s decision would be exactly the same. A comment, suggestion or remark by a judge in an opinion that is not necessary for the resolution of the case and as such is not legally binding on other courts, but can always be cited as a persuasive authority in future litigation. Also known as dictum, dicta and dicta judiciaire. A dissenting opinion is generally considered an obiter dictum. In other cases, the obiter dicta may propose an interpretation of the law which has no bearing on the present case, but which could be useful in future cases.
[2] The most notable example of such an event is the story of the famous footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938), which opposed the use of the due process clause to block most laws, suggesting that the clause could be used to remove laws dealing with “fundamental rights” issues. It is generally believed that this obiter dictum led to the doctrine of rigorous examination (and subsequently intermediate examination) in cases of racial, religious and sexual discrimination, first enunciated in Korematsu v. the United States (1944). Korematsu v. The United States itself was condemned by the same court in obiter dictum in Trump v. Hawaii (2018).
A judicial declaration can only be ratio decidendi if it relates to the decisive facts and the law of the case. Statements that are not conclusive or that relate to hypothetical facts or unrelated legal issues are obiter dicta. Obiter dicta (often simply dicta or obiter) are remarks or remarks made by a judge that, although included in the court`s opinion, are not necessarily part of the court`s decision. In a judicial opinion, obiter dicta includes, inter alia, words that are “introduced for illustrative, analogous or argumentative purposes”. [1] Contrary to the ratio decidendi, obiter dicta are not the subject of the judicial decision, even if they are correct legal statements. The so-called Wambaugh inversion test provides that in order to determine whether a judicial declaration is ratio or obiter, one must reverse the argument, that is, whether the decision would have been different if the declaration had been omitted. If so, the statement is decisive and constitutes the ratio; If it`s not crucial, it`s obiter. When a written opinion of the court is issued, it contains two elements: (1) ratio decidendi and (2) obiter dicta.
Ratio decidendi is the Latin term meaning “the reason for the decision” and refers to statements about critical facts and the law of the case. These are crucial to the decision of the court itself. Obiter dicta are additional observations, remarks and opinions on other matters of the judge. These often explain the reasons for the court`s decision and, while they may provide guidance in similar cases in the future, they are not binding. The obiter dicta of the U.S. Supreme Court can have an influence. [10] [11] [3] [12] [13] An example in Supreme Court history is Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. in 1886. A flippant remark by Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, recorded by the court reporter before the hearing, now forms the basis of the doctrine that corporations are entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether or not Chief Justice Waite`s remark sets a binding precedent is debatable, but subsequent judgments treat it as such.
2 definitions found for this term. Definitions are listed in the order in which the source books were published (last first). Obiter dictum (usually used in the plural obiter dicta) is a Latin expression meaning “other things said”,[1] that is, a remark in a legal opinion “casually said” by a judge or arbitrator. This is a concept derived from English common law, according to which a judgment consists of only two elements: ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. For the purposes of the case-law, the ratio decidendi is binding, while obiter dicta are only convincing. [2] [3] It is not always clear from a court`s written decision what obiter dicta is and what is ratio decidendi, but it is essential to know which parts of the decision constitute binding precedents. To support this provision, American jurist Eugene Wambaugh proposed what is now called the Wambaugh inversion test. This test indicates that the following question is asked about suspect parties: Would the decision have been different if the statement had been omitted? If the answer is yes, then this statement is an essential element of the decision and therefore ratio decidendi. [Latin for “things that are said in passing.”] In an appellate court decision, the ratio decidendi (the reason for the decision) is binding on the lower courts, but judicial comments, which are obiter dicta, which are not necessary for the judgment, are only “persuasive” for future cases. When reading a court decision, obiter dicta can be recognized by words such as “introduced by analogy” or “by way of illustration”. Obiter dicta can be as short as a brief remark or hypothetical example, or as long as a thorough discussion of the relevant law. In both cases, the additional information is provided to provide context for the court opinion.
Our editors will review what you have submitted and decide if the article needs to be revised. The arguments and reasoning of a dissenting judgment (as used in the United Kingdom[14] and Australia[15]) or a dissenting opinion (a term used by courts in the United States) are also obiter dicta. However, these could also be invoked if a court finds that its earlier decision was erroneous, as when the U.S. Supreme Court cited the dissent of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in Hammer v. Dagenhart, when he overthrew Hammer in United States v. Darby Lumber Co. American jurist John Chipman Gray said: “So that an opinion can have the weight of a precedent. it must be an expert opinion whose training is necessary to decide a particular case; In other words, it should not be obiter dictum. Dicta often take the form of unnecessarily broad statements. When a young man deliberately murdered his grandfather to prevent him from revoking a will, the court found that the beneficiary was not entitled to the bequest the will had provided him, stating that the law will not allow someone to “profit from his own wrongs or make a claim for his own injustice.
or to acquire property by their own crime.” In a subsequent case involving a legatee who had negligently caused the death of the testator in a car accident, the same result would not necessarily follow. The court is free to distinguish cases according to their facts and to limit the general dictum of the previous case.